In broad terms, compare and contrast at least two of Marx, Weber, Durkheim and Simmel on the? advantages and disadvantages of modernity (extensive division of labor, specialization, la

From Theory to Critique of Modernity The Development of Simmel’s Sociology Author(s): Stephan Fuchs Source: Michigan Sociological Review, No. 5 (Fall, 1991), pp. 1-18 Published by: Michigan Sociological Association Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40968948 .

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Michigan Sociological Review, No. 5, Fall, 1991.

From Theory to Critique of Modernity The Development of Simmel’s Sociology

Stephan Fuchs University of Virginia

Georg Simmel (1858-1918) was an extraordinary figure in German academe. Despite the support he received from famous colleagues such as Max Weber and Heinrich Rickert, Simmel did not get tenure until 1914, when he joined Strasbourg University; a rather peripheral school at the time. Certainly, powerful antisemitist sentiments in the educational bureaucracy were partly responsible for Simmer s position as an academic outsider.1 And, in turn, his peripheral position partly explains why there is no stable tradition of “Formal Sociology.” Of course, SimmePs writings continuerò influence contemporary sociology; especially exchange theory, conflict sociology, role theory, and small group research (Mills, 1965; Coser, 1965; Levine, Carter, and Gorman, 1976). And, more recently, critical theorists of modernity and postmodernity (Frisby, 1985; Dahme and Rammstedt, 1984) have re-discovered the late SimmePs pessimistic diagnosis of modern culture. But, generally, his work is regarded as a pool of seemingly unrelated ideas, not as a coherent paradigm for social theory.2

Unlike Marx, Weber, Durkheim, or Parsons, Simmel did not attempt to develop a general and systematic framework for social theory. Therefore, we regard him today as a “semi-classic” only. Simmel’s explicitly sociological writings make up only a small portion of his work. After his grand Sociology (1908), he begins to lose interest in the field and turns to more philosophical and metaphysical issues. Overall, Simmel was an essayist rather than a social theorist (Frisby, 1981). Especially SimmePs later, much less-known, writings lack a homogeneous subject-matter and frame of reference. In an almost literary style, they deal with religion and music, with great individuals such as Rembrandt, Kant, and Goethe, with fashion and art, and with the seemingly banal experiences of everyday life.

But there might be yet another reason for the unsystematic and fragmentary character of SimmePs oeuvre. Due to the loose organizational and professional

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structure of emerging German sociology, the discipline was still lacking a consistent theoretical framework, as well as a subject-matter sui generis (Aaron, 1964; Abel, 1965). Therefore, numerous intellectual movements from within and outside aca- demic science shaped emerging sociology. Since the multifaceted intellectual culture around thefìn de siede was not yet separated into fully professionalized disciplines, emerging sociology was largely the business of “intellectuals” in the classical sense of the term.

That is, German sociologists were not so much academic specialists confined to universities, but rather participants in larger metropolitan upper class cultures. Being a Privatdozent at Berlin University, Simmel was very much part of this culture, and probably spent more time with artists and poets than with academics (see Gassen and Landmann, 1958). Particularly, the conservative and romantic critique of modern culture and the passionate irrationalism expressed in the “philosophy of life” (Lebensphilosophie) were fashionable among Berlin intellectuals at the time (Lieber, 1974).

The problem faced by a comprehensive presentation of Simmer s sociology and philosophy is that he draws upon so many diverse academic and intellectual movements. Among them are the philosophy of life, the conservative critique of modernity, positivism, organicism, and Neokantian epistemology. Following Land- mann (1968), we may very roughly distinguish three phases in the development of Simmer s thought.

During the first phase (1890-1900), Simmel is concerned with establishing “Formal Sociology” as a legitimate scientific discipline. To gain epistemic legitimacy, early sociology had to turn away from speculative philosophy and model its methods and subject-matter after the natural sciences. As social physics, sociology must analyze social processes such as interaction or differentiation in the same manner as physics or biology analyze natural processes. Society can be analyzed according to the research canons of empirical science. Positivist method and organicist conception of society a la Spencer determine Simmel’ s sociology during this phase.

During the second phase (1900-1908), Simmel contributes to the Neokantian project to replace historicism by a “critique of historical reason”.3 Like Weber, Simmel is now especially interested in the transcendental presuppositions of the humanities, especially history. As opposed to the first phase, Simmel now adheres to the dualist Neokantian position in the German Methodenstreit holding that “idiogra- phic” differ substantially from “nomothetic” sciences. During this second phase, Simmel is no longer primarily concerned with developing sociology as empirical science. Even his grand Sociology (1908) deals extensively with broad epistemological issues.

Finally, the third phase (1908-1918) is devoted to the philosophy of life and the critique of modernity. With Bergson, Schopenhauer, and Nietzsche, Simmel now turns against the rationalism of an objectified culture that is no longer rooted in

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concrete individual experience. In his monographs about great individuals such as Goethe or Rembrandt, Simmel celebrates the cult of the creative genius who alone manages to escape from the iron cage of alienated culture. In his later writings, Simmel expresses the deep existential pessimism underlying the “tragic consciousness” (Lenk, 1987) of German intellectuals at the time. With Weber he shares the heroic attitude of the bourgeois individual who fights a lonely and hopeless fight against the alienating but inevitable forces of modernity. With Adorno, whom Simmel influenced via Lukacs and Bloch, the late Simmel shares the vague hope that art might be the only life form capable of resisting reification.

I shall suggest that despite the unsystematic and essayistic character of his work, Simmel always dealt with one grand theme: the relationship between individualism and modernity. In fact, his changing evaluation of this relationship marks the transition from sociological theory to philosophical critique of modernity. This transition occurs in the last chapter of the Philosophy of Money (1900/1978), but is already present in Social Differentiation (1890); much earlier than research on Simmel has assumed.

Modernity and Individual Freedom I: Early Writings

SimmePs early account of the origins of modernity closely resembles the analyses given by Spencer (1874-96) and Durkheim (1893/1964). Like Spencer, Simmel (1890) understands social differentiation as a special case of natural evolution. Social differentiation occurs because differentiated societies can perform more heterogene- ous tasks more effectively. The development of societies follows the same general laws as the development of natural species. Demographic growth leads to increased competition over scarce resources and, in turn, competition leads to functional and vertical differentiation.

According to Simmel (1890), social differentiation favors the emergence of modern individualism for several reasons. First, the expansion of “social circles” (groups, communities, societies), which follows processes of differentiation, weakens social control, and increases individual autonomy. While small and homogeneous commu- nities tightly control and supervise their members, more differentiated and larger societies must grant individuals more mobility and independence. Furthermore, social differentiation leads to multiple memberships in overlapping social circles. In this way, the modern individual is possible as a unique combination of diverse roles and organizational memberships.

At this point, it is very important to note that Simmel works with two entirely different notions of individuality: individuality1 and individuality2 (Simmel, 1957). Much confusion in SimmePs argument and its interpretation can be avoided if these two notions are distinguished very clearly. Individuality1 is the concept of individu- ality developed by 18th century rationalist enlightenment philosophy (see Hamlyn,

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1987:206-216; Jones, 1952:805ff.; Habermas, 1973). This concept focusses on the abstract and egalitarian autonomy of agents acting according to their own free wills and private interests. Economically, individuality1 means formally free and independ- ent market actors exchanging material resources to maximize profits within the limits set by contractual law. Economic agents behave according to utilitarian preferences and rational choices, not according to the corporate solidarities invested in traditional markets. Within the limits of contractual law, any action that is not explicitly prohibited is permitted. This economic model of individuality1 was first developed by Scottish utilitarian philosophy and classical economics.

Ethically, individuality1 refers to rational and responsible moral actors who follow self-imposed rules that, ideally, express the generalized ethical viewpoint of human- kind. Morally autonomous subjects do not observe prescriptive loyalties and ascriptive obligations, but follow the abstract and révisable standards of Practical Reason. This is the model of individuality1 introduced by Kantian ethics.

Politically, individuality1 means a sovereign corporate body of political actors collectively determining their own legislation within a nation state. Free citizens realize their “natural” constitutional rights to discuss and decide on public affairs. This notion was first propagated by French political philosophy; taking the classical Greek polis as its historical model.

And finally, the epistemic individual1 uses abstract Theoretical or “Pure” Reason to discard all those (religious and metaphysical) beliefs that fail to pass critical empirical and logical examination. The modern epistemic subject originated in Cartesian and Kantian epistemology.

In sum, individuality1 refers to the legal, ethical, political, and epistemic autonomy of independent agents acting according to private but generalizable interests. It is this notion of individuality we commonly associate with societal modernity; i.e., with political democracy, market economy, privatized morality, and scientific rationality (Parsons, 1966, 1971).

On the other hand, the concept of individuality2 was developed by 19th century romanticism. As opposed to individuality1, individuality2 captures the substantive differences between unique personalities, not what is abstractly shared by autono- mous subjects. The romantic notion of individuality2 emerged in opposition to the “pale” and “fleshless” rationalist concept of individuality1 (see Walzel, 1965). Individuality2 is expressed in the romantic idealization of the genius, not in the rationalist trinity of bourgeois, homme, and citoyen.

Simmel did not always clearly distinguish between these two opposed concepts of individuality, and much confusion in the interpretation of SimmeFs theory of modernity has resulted from this failure. While some interpreters (e.g., Turner and Beeghley, 1981) have concluded that Simmel celebrates modernity as the great promoter of individual freedom, others (e.g., Dahme and Rammstedt, 1984) insist that for Simmel, modernity is incompatible with living an individualized life. But I

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would say that both interpretations are correct because they refer to different notions of individuality. Simmel never ceased to believe that the forces of modernity; i.e., differentiation, money, positive law, and formal logic emancipated individuality1 from traditional bonds. But, in his later works, he more and more realized that individuality2; i.e., the concrete being of unique personalities, was incompatible with modernity and remained possible only in the life form of the creative genius. Thus, I would argue that there is no radical break in SimmeFs thought; strictly separating early sociology and theory of modernity from later metaphysics and critique of modernity. What happened, I believe, is that Simmel became more and more interested in the romantic notion of individuality2 and realized that unlike individu- ality1, individuality2 was endangered by modernity. In this view, the only real discontinuity in Simmel’ s work is a shift in interest and a corresponding change in his style of thinking. It remains true, however, that Simmel did become a cultural critic of modernity instead of continuing to be its sociological theorist and apologist. When did this transition occur?

It is generally assumed that the transition from sociological theory to metaphysical critique of modernity occurs in the Philosophy of Money (1900/1978). But critical remarks against modernity are already present in Social Differentiation (1890), one of Simmel’s earliest positivist treatises. As we have already seen, Simmel (1890) argues that social differentiation liberates individuality1 by weakening social control. At the same time, social differentiation leads to professional specialization so that individu- ality2 is structurally possible because of the diversity of complex occupational status sets. Individuals2 all differ from each other since they all occupy different sets of roles and memberships; at any given point in time as well as in the course of a unique biography.

The crisis of individuality2, however, arises when a combination of diverse roles cannot compensate for the alienating consequences of professional specialization. Like Marx, Simmel realizes that in the long run, specialization will contradict a * ‘fully developed” individuality2. The narrow restrictions specialization imposes on individ- ual life can partially be compensated by the diversity of role sets, but Simmel predicts that specialization will eventually impoverish individual life. The technological development of society requires further specialization, but further specialization is incompatible with individuality2: “It is impossible to build a house out of houses (Simmel, 1890:138).”

Modernity and Individual Freedom II: The Transition to Critique of Modernity in the “Philosophy of Money” (1900)

Current mainstream Simmel-interpretations regard the Philosophy of Money (1900/1978) as an early treatise on economics or exchange theory (e.g., Turner, 1986; Collins, 1988). But Simmel himself understood his book as dealing with metaphysics

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and ontology. In this sense, the Philosophy of Money belongs to the later phase of his work when Simmel abandons sociology and empirical science altogether. For Simmel, money is much more than an economic unit mediating exchange. Money exemplifies an ontological principle: the creations of humankind tend to separate from their creators and begin to live an independent life. Once created, this realm of external reality or “objective culture” constrains human action and experience. Although money, as well as all economic value, originally emerges from the subjective desire to possess a scarce and distant good, money soon circulates through world markets that escape our direct and conscious control, and that determine our actions “behind our backs.” As a reality sui generis, money only re-instates what Simmel later calls the universal “tragedy of culture”:

The philosophical significance of money is that it represents within the practical world the most certain image and the clearest embodiment of the formula of all being, according to which things receive their meaning through each other, and have their being determined by their mutual relations (Simmel, 1900/1978:128-129).

SimmeFs philosophy of money is the metaphysical answer to Marxism. Like Weber (1904-05/1930), Simmel wants to correct the materialistic one-sidedness that he sees in Marx’ theory of history. But Simmel goes far beyond Weber in that he replaces historical sociology by speculative metaphysics. In fact, SimmeFs philosophy of money anticipates the metaphysical turn Marxism took in the Critical Theory of Adorno and Horkheimer. Their Dialectics of Enlightenment (1972) de-historized Marx’ theory of capitalism to a “critique of instrumental reason” that sees reification and unfreedom emerge with the rise of instrumental control over nature. What Marx argued was the result of wage labor and what he hoped would disappear together with private property, Adorno and Horkheimer (1972) believed was inherent in the metaphysical destiny of occidental reason. Similarly, SimmeFs philosophy of money narrates the tragedy of culture, not just the historical rise and expansion of capitalism. The emergence of money and modernity shows once more that the creations of humankind become separated from their creators and their original intentions.

As in Social Differentiation (1890) and, to a lesser extent, in Sociology (1908), the crucial theme of the Philosophy of Money is the relationship between modernity and individual freedom. As the quintessential force of modernity, money liberates individuality1. Money permits the expansion of trade beyond local markets. Without money, exchanges depend on the concrete complementarity of particular demands and supplies. By mediating exchanges, money separates exchange from use values and thus extends the range of trade. In turn, the expansion of markets increases the size of communities and thus weakens social control. Trade leads to larger and more cosmopolitan associations among people. Urbanization and the formation of nation states replace village communities, and thus emancipate individuals1 from tight

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supervision and permanent local control. Money also changes the structures of social relationships. Even within feudal

serfdom, money permits dependent peasants to produce whatever they want since tributes no longer have to be paid in kind. Monetary tributes increase the autonomy of serfs since they can now decide what to produce. Generally, money de-personalizes social relationships and power structures. Simmel (1900/1978:297-303) observes that industrial workers receiving money wages are not subordinates to individual entrepreneurs, but to formal organizational power. The de-personalization of power structures is experienced as liberation and increasing autonomy. Money replaces the control over persons by the organizational control over labor, and one-sided personal dependencies by mutual contractual obligations.

In respect to social structure, money separates “having” from “being.” In feudal societies, property depends on ascribed social status; “being” determines the chances of “having.” Money, on the other hand, is indifferent toward particular occupations or ascribed social statuses. Money can be earned in many different ways, by many different persons, and it can be spent to buy any good that can be sold. That is, money makes possible geographic and social mobility as well as individual autonomy. In short, by modernizing social structure, money emancipates individuality1 from tight social control, from patrimonial authority, and from restrictions on mobility.

Finally, and very characteristically, Simmel (1900/1978:321-326) examines the relationship between money and freedom according to a figure of thought prominent in idealist philosophy. For idealist philosophy (see Hegel, 1958), freedom is the ability to control the external world, or to realize one’s individuality by subjecting nature to one’s will. But since the empirical world is partially independent and operates according to its internal laws and regularities, nature restricts human control and thus individual freedom. Money, however, does not have a real material being. Unlike other external objects, money does not resist our attempts at control. Or, to say it in terms of political economy, money has no use value but only exchange value. Even paper bills are not essential, for they can be replaced by manipulating balances in bank accounts. Thus, money is not a part of nature and does not have any intrinsic material properties that would resist human control. Therefore, Simmel optimistically concludes, money is the perfect being of individual freedom.

Money or Freedom

But still within the Philosophy of Money, Simmel turns into a critic of money and modernity. As a social theorist of rationalization, he celebrates money as the great promoter of individual freedom. But, as a cultural critic of rationalization, Simmel examines the alienating consequences that money and modernity have for concrete individual life. Simmel begins to realize that he is dealing with two different notions of individuality: individuality1 and individuality2. Consequently, he discovers the

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Janusface of modernity. Modernity emancipates individuals1 from traditional obligations and patrimonial domination, but at the same time, it depersonalizes and reifies the concrete experiences of individuals2.

Money rationalizes the style of modern life (Simmel, 1900/1978:429ff.). Metro- politan society converts all social relationships into rational exchanges between economic individuals1. Modern urban life is experienced as a series of instrumental calculations designed to realize utilitarian goals through complex teleological chains of action. The blase and detached attitude of the metropolitan individual is the psychological pendant to the commodification of interpersonal relations. In the metropolis, time is money, nature is created environment, space is real estate, and social relations are commodity exchanges. The urbanization of life transforms individual experience into a meaningless sequence of disconnected sensory shocks. As a stranger among strangers, the metropolitan individual has lost his or her biography and face. Although the mon