Reading: Ethical Judgments and Matters of Fact
David Hume
Study Questions
As you read the excerpt, please consider the following questions:
1. How does Hume employ the fact of animal incest to advance his argument that morality does not consist merely of “matters of fact” and that morality is not merely an “object of reason”?
2. Explain Hume’s idea that morality is a matter of feelings and sentiments.
3. Why does Hume have a problem with deducing an ought from an is?
From David Hume, A Treatise on Human Nature, (1739; Project Gutenberg, 2010), bk. III, pt. 1, sec. 1, http://www.gutenberg.org/files/4705/4705-h/4705-h.htm
I would fain ask any one, why incest in the human species is criminal, and why the very same action, and the same relations in animals have not the smallest moral turpitude and deformity? If it be answered, that this action is innocent in animals, because they have not reason sufficient to discover its turpitude; but that man, being endowed with that faculty which ought to restrain him to his duty, the same action instantly becomes criminal to him; should this be said, I would reply, that this is evidently arguing in a circle. For before reason can perceive this turpitude, the turpitude must exist; and consequently is independent of the decisions of our reason, and is their object more properly than their effect. According to this system, then, every animal, that has sense, and appetite, and will; that is, every animal must be susceptible of all the same virtues and vices, for which we ascribe praise and blame to human creatures. All the difference is, that our superior reason may serve to discover the vice or virtue, and by that means may augment the blame or praise: But still this discovery supposes a separate being in these moral distinctions, and a being, which depends only on the will and appetite, and which, both in thought and reality, may be distinguished from the reason. Animals are susceptible of the same relations, with respect to each other, as the human species, and therefore would also be susceptible of the same morality, if the essence of morality consisted in these relations. Their want of a sufficient degree of reason may hinder them from perceiving the duties and obligations of morality, but can never hinder these duties from existing; since they must antecedently exist, in order to their being perceived. Reason must find them, and can never produce them. This argument deserves to be weighed, as being, in my opinion, entirely decisive.
Nor does this reasoning only prove, that morality consists not in any relations, that are the objects of science; but if examined, will prove with equal certainty, that it consists not in any matter of fact, which can be discovered by the understanding. This is the second part of our argument; and if it can be made evident, we may conclude, that morality is not an object of reason. But can there be any difficulty in proving, that vice and virtue are not matters of fact, whose existence we can infer by reason? Take any action allowed to be vicious: Willful murder, for instance. Examine it in all lights, and see if you can find that matter of fact, or real existence, which you call vice. In which-ever way you take it, you find only certain passions, motives, volitions and thoughts. There is no other matter of fact in the case. The vice entirely escapes you, as long as you consider the object. You never can find it, till you turn your reflection into your own breast, and find a sentiment of disapprobation, which arises in you, towards this action. Here is a matter of fact; but it is the object of feeling, not of reason. It lies in yourself, not in the object. So that when you pronounce any action or character to be vicious, you mean nothing, but that from the constitution of your nature you have a feeling or sentiment of blame from the contemplation of it. Vice and virtue, therefore, may be compared to sounds, colours, heat and cold, which, according to modern philosophy, are not qualities in objects, but perceptions in the mind: And this discovery in morals, like that other in physics, is to be regarded as a considerable advancement of the speculative sciences; though, like that too, it has little or no influence on practice. Nothing can be more real, or concern us more, than our own sentiments of pleasure and uneasiness; and if these be favourable to virtue, and unfavourable to vice, no more can be requisite to the regulation of our conduct and behaviour.
I cannot forbear adding to these reasonings an observation, which may, perhaps, be found of some importance. In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have always remarked, that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary way of reasoning, and establishes the being of a God, or makes observations concerning human affairs; when of a sudden I am surprized to find, that instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is, and is not, I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an ought, or an ought not. This change is imperceptible; but is, however, of the last consequence. For as this ought, or ought not, expresses some new relation or affirmation, it is necessary that it should be observed and explained; and at the same time that a reason should be given, for what seems altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be a deduction from others, which are entirely different from it. But as authors do not commonly use this precaution, I shall presume to recommend it to the readers; and am persuaded, that this small attention would subvert all the vulgar systems of morality, and let us see, that the distinction of vice and virtue is not founded merely on the relations of objects, nor is perceived by reason.
Reading: Ethical Judgments and Matters of Fact
### Study Questions on David Hume’s Ethical Judgments and Matters of Fact
**1. How does Hume employ the fact of animal incest to advance his argument that morality does not consist merely of “matters of fact” and that morality is not merely an “object of reason”?**
Hume uses the example of animal incest to illustrate that moral distinctions are not based on objective facts or reason alone. He points out that while incest among animals is not seen as morally wrong, the same action among humans is considered criminal. This discrepancy suggests that morality is not a matter of rational assessment of facts, but rather a product of human sentiments and social constructs. If morality were purely rational and based on objective facts, it would apply universally to all beings capable of the same actions. Hume argues that the moral turpitude associated with human incest must exist independently of reason since reason only perceives this pre-existing moral sentiment.
**2. Explain Hume’s idea that morality is a matter of feelings and sentiments.**
Hume posits that moral judgments arise from human feelings and sentiments rather than objective facts or rational deliberations. He asserts that when we label an action as virtuous or vicious, we are expressing our emotional response to that action, not stating an objective fact about the action itself. For instance, when we deem willful murder as wrong, it is because we experience a sentiment of disapprobation towards it. This sentiment is internal and subjective, rooted in our nature and emotional responses. Thus, morality is akin to sensory experiences like sounds or colors, which exist in the perceiver’s mind rather than in the external object.
**3. Why does Hume have a problem with deducing an ought from an is?**
Hume highlights a fundamental issue in moral philosophy: the logical gap between descriptive statements (what is) and prescriptive statements (what ought to be). He argues that many moral systems transition imperceptibly from describing facts about the world to prescribing moral duties, without justifying this leap. Hume contends that factual statements about the world cannot inherently contain or lead to moral imperatives. For instance, observing that humans have certain desires or behaviors (is) does not logically entail that they ought to act in a particular way. To Hume, the prescriptive “ought” introduces a new type of statement that requires its own justification, independent of merely factual descriptions.
### Application of Hume’s Concepts
**Understanding Hume’s Argument:**
– Hume illustrates that moral values are not derived from empirical observations or rational deductions but from internal sentiments.
– This viewpoint challenges the notion that reason alone can dictate moral principles, emphasizing instead the role of human emotions and societal norms.
**Impact on Modern Ethics:**
– Hume’s argument informs contemporary debates on moral relativism, suggesting that what is deemed right or wrong can vary based on cultural and individual sentiments.
– It also influences discussions on the nature of ethical reasoning, particularly in separating descriptive ethics (what people believe) from normative ethics (what people ought to do).
**Concluding Thoughts:**
Hume’s insights emphasize the complexity of moral philosophy, urging careful consideration of how we derive and justify ethical principles. His work underscores the importance of recognizing the subjective nature of moral judgments and the potential pitfalls of conflating factual descriptions with moral prescriptions.
### References
Hume, D. (1739). *A Treatise of Human Nature*. Project Gutenberg. http://www.gutenberg.org/files/4705/4705-h/4705-h.htm
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